Introduction
There is remarkable variation in the practices by which seemingly similar fi rms are managed (Bloom and Van Reenen 2007) . Those diff erences have been attributed to a wide variety of industry, fi rm, and managerial characteristics including competitive pressure (Hermalin 1994; Bennett 2013) , psychological traits (Galasso and Simcoe 2011; Malmendier and Tate 2005) or personal "style" of the CEO who leads the organization (Bertrand and Schoar 2003) , and the ownership structure of the fi rm (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988) .
In this chapter we study the adoption of basic management practices in fi rms in which the CEO of the fi rm and its founder are one and the samewhich we defi ne as "founder CEO" fi rms in what follows. While founder CEOs are typically portrayed as highly extrinsically and intrinsically motivated individuals (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Wasserman 2006) , it is unclear whether they should necessarily serve as top managers of their fi rm. There are several reasons why founders may not be the best top managers. First, the skills needed to create a new venture may not necessarily coincide with the capabilities needed to lead the fi rm through more advanced phases of This chapter has been prepared for the NBER/CRIW conference "Measuring Entrepreneurial Businesses: Current Knowledge and Challenges." Sadun would like to thank Harvard Business School and the Kauff man Foundation for fi nancial support. For acknowledgments, sources of research support, and disclosure of the authors' material fi nancial relationships, if any, please see http://www.nber.org/chapters/c13499.ack. growth and expansion. 1 Furthermore, founder CEOs might be reluctant to adopt practices that standardize the operations of the fi rm, since these practices reduce the idiosyncratic and personalized aspects of the entrepreneur's role (Rajan 2012) and the private benefi ts of control associated with them (Bandiera, Prat, and Sadun 2013) .
We investigate these issues using the World Management Survey (WMS), an international data set providing detailed information on the management practices for a large sample of medium and large manufacturing fi rms (Bloom et al. 2014; Bloom and Van Reenen 2007) in thirty-two countries. The management processes surveyed in the WMS are akin to managerial "best practices" and have been found to be strongly and causally related to superior fi rm performance (Bloom and Van Reenen 2007; Bloom et al. 2013; Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen 2016) .
The WMS includes a large number of founder and nonfounder CEOs' fi rms of similar ages and sizes within the same industries and countries. Although we cannot estimate causal eff ects of being led by a founder CEO, the richness of the data allows us to examine the conditional correlation between management and the founder CEO status of the company while controlling for a large set of potentially confounding covariates suggested by theory and earlier empirical investigations such as fi rm age, size, average skills of the workforce, country of operation, and main industry of activity.
We start our analysis by reporting three main stylized facts. First, fi rms led by founder CEOs have lower management scores relative to other forms of concentrated and dispersed ownership. Second, the association between management and fi rm performance in founder CEO fi rms is positive and signifi cant, similar to what is generally found for other ownership types. This positive association suggests both that the lower level of management quality in founder CEO fi rms is likely to result in worse fi rm performance and that lower management scores among founder CEO fi rms are not due to the fact that these fi rms have lower returns to management. Third, fi rms led by founder CEOs experience signifi cant improvements in their management practices upon a change of ownership, and these improvements are generally much larger than what is found for other ownership transitions.
A natural question arising from these fi ndings is: Why are fi rms led by founder CEOs not adopting performance-enhancing managerial processes or replacing themselves with managers who do? We present three notnecessarily-mutually-exclusive possible classes of explanations for the persistence of poor management practices at fi rms with founder CEOs despite the performance penalty: (a) that founder CEOs are unaware of their managerial gaps; (b) that environmental or institutional variables make it more costly or less attractive for founder CEOs to hire more capable managers to replace themselves, or to select practices consistent with the process of standardization needed to attract external capital (Rajan 2012) ; and (c) that the adoption of formalized managerial processes may interfere with the founders' ability to pursue nonpecuniary benefi ts of control, such as investing in a pet project or hiring people based on personal or family affi liations. The initial fi ndings presented in the chapter provide support for (a) and (c), but we do not fi nd evidence that founder CEO fi rms are systematically diff erent according to the quality of the institutional environments in which they are embedded.
Our fi ndings face several limitations. First, the nature of the fi rms included in the WMS data (companies between 50 and 5,000 employees) signifi cantly dampens our ability to analyze the role of founder CEOs on organizations in their early stages of life and/or managers in the early years of their tenure, which may both be more salient to the entrepreneurship literature. Second, the nature of our data does not allow us to estimate the causal eff ect of founder CEOs on management adoption and fi rm performance; rather, we present simple conditional correlations. Relatedly, the lack of information on CEO skills, preferences, and experiences does not allow us to look in more detail at the heterogeneity within diff erent types of founder CEOs.
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 4.2 we provide a description of the WMS data. In section 4.3 we explore the diff erences in management practices between fi rms led by founder CEOs and fi rms and all other forms of leader-ownership. In section 4.4 we explore the relationship between management and fi rm performance. In section 4.5 we present the analysis of the possible drivers of the managerial diff erences across ownership types. Section 4.6 concludes.
Data

Survey Methodology
To measure the presence of basic management practices, we use the World Management Survey (WMS), which was collected using a methodology fi rst described in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) . The survey is based on an interview-based evaluation tool that defi nes and scores from 1 ("worst practice") to 5 ("best practice") across eighteen key management practices. Appendix table 4A.1 lists the management questions and also gives some sense of how the responses to each question are mapped onto the scoring grid. 2 The evaluation tool attempts to measure management practices in three key areas. First, monitoring: How well do organizations monitor what goes on inside the fi rm and use this information for continuous improvement? Second, targets: Do organizations set the right targets, track the right outcomes, and take appropriate action if the two are inconsistent? Third, incentives/people management: Are organizations promoting and rewarding employees based on performance, prioritizing careful hiring, and trying to keep their best employees? 3 The methodology gives a fi rm a low score if it fails to track performance, has no eff ective targets, does not take ability and eff ort into account when deciding on promotions (e.g., completely tenure based), and has no system to address persistent employee underperformance. In contrast, a high-scoring organization frequently monitors and tries to improve its processes, sets comprehensive and stretching targets, promotes high-performing employees, and addresses (by retraining/rotating and, if unsuccessful, dismissing) underperforming employees.
The survey design included teams of MBA-type students with business experience conducting the interviews with the plant managers in their native languages. Plant managers were purposely selected, as they were senior enough to have an overview of management practices but not so senior as to be detached from day-to-day operations. The survey is based on a double-blind methodology. First, managers were not told they were being scored or shown the scoring grid. They were told only that they were being "interviewed about their day-to-day management practices." To do this, the interviewers asked open-ended questions 4 and continued with open questions focusing on specifi c practices and trying to elicit examples until the interviewer could make an accurate assessment of the fi rm's practices. 5 Second, the interviewers were not told anything in advance about the organization's performance; they were provided only with the organization's name, telephone number, and industry.
The data set includes randomly sampled medium-sized fi rms (employing between 50 and 5,000 workers) in the manufacturing sector. The sampling 3. These practices are similar to those emphasized in earlier work on management practices, by, for example, Osterman (1994) , Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997) , and Black and Lynch (2001) .
4. For example, on the fi rst monitoring dimension in the manufacturing survey, the interviewer starts by asking the open question "Could you please tell me about how you monitor your production process?" rather than a closed question such as "Do you monitor your production daily [yes/no]?" 5. For example, the second question on that monitoring dimension is "What kinds of measures would you use to track performance?" rather than "Do you track your performance?" and the third is "If I walked around your factory, what could I tell about how each person was performing?" The combined responses to the questions within this dimension are scored against a grid that goes from 1, which is defi ned as Measures tracked do not indicate directly if overall business objectives are being met. Tracking is an ad hoc process (certain processes aren't tracked at all), to 5, which is defi ned as Performance is continuously tracked and communicated, both formally and informally, to all staff using a range of visual management tools. frame was drawn in such a way that the fi rms sampled for each country are representative of the distribution of medium-sized manufacturing fi rms across a variety of diff erent databases. The survey achieved a response rate of about 50 percent through a combination of government endorsements and internal managerial eff orts. Reassuringly, responses were uncorrelated with the (independently collected) performance measures for the fi rm (see Bloom et al. 2014 for details) .
The data set also includes a series of "noise controls" on the interview process itself (such as the time of day and the day of the week), characteristics of the interviewee (such as tenure in fi rm), and the identity of the interviewer (a full set of dummy variables for the interviewer to account for any interviewer bias). In some specifi cations we include these variables to control for measurement error. The data was also internally validated through silent monitoring of the interviews (whereby a second person listening in on a phone extension independently scored the interview), and repeat interviews (using a diff erent interviewer and a second plant manager within the same fi rm). In both cases, the comparisons suggested a high level of consistency across diff erent interviewees and interviewers (see Bloom et al. 2014 for details).
Ownership
Firms are classifi ed in several diff erent ownership categories using information collected during the survey and are subsequently cross checked against public accounts and Web searches. This process fi rst determines whether any individual person, group of individuals, or organization owns more than 25.01 percent of the shares of the company. If this is not the case, the fi rm is classifi ed as owned by "dispersed shareholders." If a single group of individuals or organization owns more than 25.01 percent of the shares of the company, the fi rm is subsequently classifi ed in the following categories according to the nature of the controlling individuals/organization: "founder" (the owner coincides with the person who founded the fi rm); "family" (the owner/s are affi liated with the family of the fi rm's founder); "private equity"; "private individuals"; "managers"; and "government." The fi rm is classifi ed in the "other" category if the ownership type does not match any of the above categories (this typically happens for country-specifi c ownership types, such as foundations in Germany). When a founder or a family owns the fi rm, we further distinguish between the cases in which the CEO is the founder him/herself or is affi liated with the owning family.
In what follows, we will focus most of the discussion on the diff erence between fi rms that are owned and run by a founder CEO, which represent in total 18 percent of the sample, and all the other types of ownership. Table 4 .1 presents a detailed breakdown of the frequencies of founder CEO fi rms included in the sample according to their ownership type across the thirty-two countries included in the sample. Clearly, founder CEO fi rms are much more likely to be found in developing countries relative to more developed economies-the fraction of founder CEO fi rms across Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) economies is 11 percent versus 30 percent in non-OECD countries. 6 Therefore, in our analysis we will primarily examine within-country comparisons in order to allay the concern that the diff erences in management practices across fi rms may capture unobserved country characteristics. 6. This fact is not surprising given that many founder CEO successions are associated with growth milestones (Wasserman 2003) , and developing economies have many more small fi rms (Hsieh and Olken 2014) .
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Management Practices in Founder CEO Firms
Cross-Sectional Analysis
In this section we examine the diff erences in management practices across diff erent ownership types, focusing, in particular, on fi rms owned and managed by their founder. Table 4 .2 shows summary statistics for the overall sample and the raw comparisons between founder CEO fi rms and the rest of the ownership categories. The fi rst three rows of table 4.2 show that founder CEO fi rms on average appear to be much less likely to have adopted the basic managerial practices included in the WMS. This gap is signifi cant when we consider the overall management score, as well as when we distinguish between the operational questions (monitoring and target setting) and the people management (Bloom and Van Reenen 2007) . Operations is the average management score for the set of questions associated with monitoring and target practices. People is the average management score for the set of questions associated with HR practices within the fi rm. ***Signifi cant at the 1 percent level.
questions asked in the survey. 7 Looking beyond sample means, fi gure 4.1 presents a kernel density plot of management scores for founder CEO fi rms and fi rms with other ownership types. The graph shows that the lower average is not due to a tail of fi rms with low management bringing down the average, but rather that the entire mass of the distribution is shifted to the left. Clearly, management is not the only dimension along which founder CEO fi rms diff er from the other ownership types included in the WMS. Although the criteria for inclusion in the management survey skew the distribution toward larger fi rms, it is still the case that founder CEO fi rms are smaller and younger than the other fi rms in the sample. Founder CEO fi rms are also less likely to be part of a domestic or foreign multinational and have, on average, a smaller fraction of employees with a college degree. To understand the extent to which the diff erences in management scores between founder CEO
Fig. 4.1 Kernel density plot of management scores for founder CEO fi rms and all other ownership types
7. The gap in management scores between founder CEO fi rms and other ownership types is still evident when we use a more granular ownership classifi cation. Figure 4A .1 in the appendix plots the raw average management scores across the fi ner ownership classifi cations introduced in section 4.2.2. Founder CEO fi rms have the lowest average management scores even relative to the second-lowest category, family fi rms managed by a family CEO. The diff erence between the two types of ownership is signifi cant at the 1 percent level, and remains so even when we control for country and industry (three-digit SIC) fi xed eff ects. fi rms versus other ownership types can be accounted for by these observable fi rm characteristics-which are typically associated with diff erences in management practices (e.g., Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen 2016)-in table 4.3 we show the conditional correlation between management and the founder CEO dummy controlling for a progressively larger set of controls (standard errors clustered at the fi rm level are shown in parentheses under the coeffi cients). To the extent that these diff erences are endogenous to ownership, the resulting estimates will provide a lower bound to the causal eff ect of the founder CEO dummy.
The dependent variable in all regressions presented in table 4.3 is the fi rm-level average management score, aggregated across all questions and standardized. Column (1) shows that the relationship between lower management scores and founder CEOs is signifi cant when comparing fi rms within countries. The diff erence is large (0.608 of a standard deviation) and signifi cant at the 1 percent level. Column (2) adds industry (Standard Industrial Classifi cation [SIC] three-digit dummies) and log fi rm employment to control for size and the diff erent distribution of founder CEO fi rms across sectors. Since larger fi rms tend to be better managed on average, adding fi rm size reduces the magnitude of the coeffi cient on the Founder CEO dummy from 0.412 to 0.254, but it remains signifi cant at the 1 percent level. In column (3) we add a control for the log of fi rm age to verify the extent to which the management gap may be driven by fi rm age, which table 4.2 shows to diff er signifi cantly across ownership types. Even looking across fi rms of a similar age, the founder CEO dummy remains of a similar magnitude and signifi cance. In column (4) we add controls for fraction of employees (managers and nonmanagers) with college degrees and multinational status, two variables that are empirically correlated with higher management scores and are systematically less prevalent in founder CEO fi rms. As a result, the coeffi cient on the founder CEO dummy is almost halved, becoming 0.162, but the coeffi cient remains signifi cant at the 1 percent level. Finally, in column (5), our baseline specifi cation going forward, we add a set of interview noise controls including interviewer identity and length of the interview. In this specifi cation, the magnitude of the coeffi cient on the founder CEO dummy lowers to 0.138. Finally, because of evidence that developed countries have higher management practices, on average, in columns (6) and (7) we look at diff erences across non-OECD and OECD countries and fi nd the results to be remarkably similar, and statistically indistinguishable, across the two subsets.
Overall, the multivariate analysis shows the existence of a managerial gap in founder CEO fi rms relative to other ownership types that is not fully accounted for by diff erences in fi rm country of location, industry of activity, fi rm size, age, or skills. Using the estimates from table 4.3, columns (1) and (5), the analysis reveals that observable fi rm, industry characteristics, and interview noise are able to account for about 67 percent of the (1)
All (2) All (3) All (4) All (5) Non-OECD (6) OECD (7) Founder CEO Notes: Dependent variable is the management z-score. All columns estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) with standard errors clustered at the company level (due to inclusion of a subset of panel fi rms). Columns (1)-(5) use the entire sample for estimation; columns (6) and (7) repeat specifi cation (5) for non-OECD and OECD countries separately. Country controls are a full set of country dummies for the countries in which the headquarters of each fi rm is located (which may be diff erent from the country in which the interviewed plant manager is located for the case of multinational fi rms). Industry controls are SIC three-digit dummies. Firm employment, fi rm age, skills, and MNE status are included and described in table 4.1. Noise controls include the duration of the interview and an indicator for the specifi c person conducting the interview. ***Signifi cant at the 1 percent level. **Signifi cant at the 5 percent level. *Signifi cant at the 10 percent level.
within-country diff erence between founder CEO fi rms and other forms of ownership ((0.412 -0.138) / 0.412), with the rest still being captured by the founder CEO dummy. To further explore the extent to which other unobservable fi rm characteristics-rather than founder CEO ownership and control-may account for this remaining gap, we turn to analyzing changes in management over time across diff erent types of ownership.
Panel Analysis
About 2,844 fi rms included in the WMS were interviewed more than once over time and, of these, 905 also experienced a change in ownership type. Of these, 167 (of the 487 total founder CEO fi rms in the subsample of 2,844 fi rms) classifi ed as founder CEO fi rms in their fi rst appearance in the WMS data set transition to a diff erent form of ownership. In this section, we exploit this specifi c sample with panel management data to further explore the extent to which the managerial gap examined in section 4.3.1 can be traced back to founder CEO ownership, rather than to other unobservable fi xed fi rm characteristics.
More specifi cally, we examine whether fi rms that where initially (i.e., at the time of their fi rst appearance in the WMS data) owned and managed by their founder and experienced a change in ownership before their subsequent appearance in the WMS data saw an improvement in their management scores relative to fi rms that did not experience an ownership change. Ownership changes are likely to be endogenous-fi rms are typically acquired on the basis of unobservable characteristics, including their productivity or potential for improvement. Therefore, to control for the possibility that the postacquisition management scores might refl ect dynamics unrelated to the change in ownership, we set up this comparison using a diff erence-in-diff erence approach, comparing the change in management scores experienced by initial founder CEO fi rms transitioning to other ownership types (167 fi rms) to the change in management scores experienced by fi rms that were initially classifi ed in other ownership categories and also experienced a change in ownership (738 fi rms).
The identifi cation assumption underlying this comparison is that the unobserved factors leading to an ownership change in founder CEO fi rms are similar to those leading to an ownership change in other types of fi rms. To gauge the empirical relevance of this assumption, we investigated the relationship between a dummy capturing the ownership change between two distinct waves of the WMS and a basic set of fi rm-level controls. Reassuringly, the results (presented in table 4A.2) show that changes in ownership are not signifi cantly correlated with the initial level of management in both types of transitions, nor with fi rm size. However, fi rm age and multinational enterprise (MNE) status both appear to be positively and signifi cantly correlated with changes in ownership for founder CEO fi rms, but not for the other ownership types. Therefore, while we do not fi nd evidence that founder CEO fi rms undergoing an ownership change are diff erentially selected on the basis of their overall management scores relative to other ownership types, we cannot entirely rule out diff erential selection based on other observable fi rm characteristics, which may be associated with future changes in management.
With this caveat in mind, we report the graphic result of the diff erencein-diff erence in fi gure 4.2. The bars show the change in management score between two periods, t (the fi rst time a fi rm appeared in the WMS) and t + 1 (the last time a fi rm appeared in the WMS), for four classes of fi rms. On the left-hand side of the graph, we focus on fi rms that at time t were not owned by a founder CEO and distinguish between those that at t + 1 had not experienced an ownership change (far left bar in the graph, 1,619 fi rms), and those that had experienced an ownership change (second bar from the left, 738 fi rms). The left-hand-side comparison indicates that there is no signifi cant change in the management scores for fi rms initially classifi ed in the nonfounder CEO category, regardless of ownership changes. On the right-hand side of the graph, we repeat the same classifi cation for fi rms that were at time t classifi ed as founder CEO fi rms, and distinguish between (738), founder CEO fi rms with no change in ownership (320), and founder CEO fi rms with a change in ownership (167). The error bar values denote 5 percent confi dence intervals for each category.
those that remained classifi ed as such at time t + 1 (third bar in the graph, 320 fi rms), and those that instead had transitioned to a diff erent ownership type at time t + 1 (far right bar in the graph, 167 fi rms).
The graph shows that while the average change in management score between t and t + 1 is not distinguishable from zero for founder CEO fi rms that did not experience a change in ownership, those fi rms that began with a founder CEO and had transitioned to a diff erent ownership type by t + 1 experienced a signifi cant increase in their management score.
Although the graph is based on raw data, these results are robust to the inclusion of country and industry dummies, fi rm characteristics, and interview noise, as shown in table 4.4. Just like in fi gure 4.2, the dependent variable in all columns of table 4.4 is the raw change in the average management score between t and t + 1. In column (1), we include as dependent variables only country dummies and an indicator for whether the ownership status changed. The results suggest that change in ownership per se is not associated with a signifi cant change in management practices. In column (2), we add an indicator for whether the ownership type was founder CEO in period t, and we fi nd that the coeffi cient is positive but statistically insignificant, suggesting that founder CEO fi rms overall did not experience large improvements in management between the two time periods. In column (3), we include an interaction between the indicators for having a founder CEO in period t and a change in ownership prior to time t + 1. This positive and signifi cant coeffi cient shows that fi rms that used to be owned and run by their founder experience large gains in their management score when these fi rms experience a change in ownership prior to time t + 1. The magnitude of the coeffi cient in the interaction is 0.171, which is 28 percent of the standard deviation in founder CEO score and signifi cant at the 1 percent level. The magnitude and signifi cance of the coeffi cient is robust to the inclusion of industry dummies (column [4]), and other fi rm and noise controls (column [5]), including the dummy capturing MNE status and fi rm age.
Overall, these results suggest that the diff erences in management scores discussed in section 4.2 are tightly related to the identity of the CEO, rather than being driven by unobserved characteristics of the fi rms led by founder CEOs. To further illustrate this point, in fi gure 4.3 we break down the changes observed in founder CEO fi rms at time t + 1 according to the detailed type of ownership at time t + 1. The average change in management scores is positive across all transitions. Interestingly, the largest change appears when the founder remains the main owner of the fi rm but an external manager takes the top position. This suggests that it is the presence of the founder in an active operational role in the company that potentially dampens management adoption, rather than founder ownership per se.
Does Management Matter in Founder CEO Firms?
A growing body of research has documented the presence of large and signifi cant performance implications for the managerial practices investigated in the WMS (Bloom et al. 2013 (Bloom et al. , 2014 Bloom and Van Reenen 2007) . However, one possible explanation behind the managerial gap explored in section 4.3 is that formalized managerial processes might be relatively less important for the performance of founder CEO fi rms. For example, founder CEOs might be able to substitute for formalized practices with other unobservable managerial skills, such as their charisma, connections, or intrinsic motivation.
We investigate this issue in table 4.5, where we estimate a simple production function-log sales as a function of the total number of employees, capital, and materials, all drawn from published accounts drawn from the accounting database ORBIS using the following specifi cation:
where y, e, m, k represent the natural logarithm of, respectively, fi rm-level sales, employment, materials, and capital; F the set of fi rm-level controls employed in earlier tables; and ζ s , τ t , and ρ c denote industry, time, and country fi xed eff ects. Since we use repeated cross sections for each fi rm, errors are clustered at the fi rm level across all columns. The key parameter in this specifi cation is γ, which allows us to evaluate whether the relationship between management and performance is systematically diff erent for founder CEO fi rms relative to other ownership types.
Column (1) shows that founder CEO fi rms tend, on average, to be 9.4 percent less productive than other ownership types (the coeffi cient is signifi cant at the 5 percent level). Column (2) adds to the specifi cation the average man-
Fig. 4.3 Changes in management score for fi rms originating with founder CEOs
Notes: The graph shows the change in management score for fi rms that were surveyed more than once in the WMS data and were owned and managed by founder CEOs in the fi rst survey wave in which they appeared. The bars display the average change in management score for each type of ownership transition, indicated in the last observation in the WMS data (as well as the changes in management score for those founder CEO fi rms that experienced no transition-the fi rst row). The number of observations of each type of transition (as well as the nontransition group) is shown in parentheses next to the ownership type. agement score which, consistent with earlier research, appears to be positive and strongly correlated with productivity (coeffi cient 0.093, standard error 0.015). This result also shows that, although diff erences in management are able to account for about 13 percent of this diff erence (0.094 -0.082 / 0.094), the founder CEO dummy remains statistically signifi cant at the 10 percent level. In column (3) we introduce the founder CEO * management interaction to test for diff erential slopes by ownership types. We fi nd the interaction to be small and positive, though statistically insignifi cant at conventional levels. This basic fi nding is confi rmed in columns (4), (5), and (6), where we look, respectively, at one-year log changes in sales, ROCE, and ROA as alternative outcome variables. Overall, we fi nd no support for the hypothesis that management might be a less critical factor in fi rms led by their founders relative to other ownership types.
Why do Founder CEO Have Low Management Scores?
The persistence of founder CEOs using weaker management practices in light of the positive performance associated with management is a puzzle. If founder CEOs have a stake in the fi nancial performance of the organization, it seems that they would be better served by either adopting performance-enhancing practices or by replacing themselves with professional managers.
In this section, we explore some of the reasons why we might observe this nonadoption of management practices among founders. First, we investigate whether the managerial gap explored in section 4.3 might be due to informational constraints, that is, founder CEOs might simply not know or not be able to recognize the added value of the practices we investigate. Second, founder fi rms may arise in situations where the incentive to adopt these practices and standardize the business practices of the organization might be dampened by the institutional constraints in which the fi rms are embedded (Rajan 2012) . Third, founders might resist the adoption of formalized management practices because they derive nonmonetary benefi ts of control (Hamilton 2000; Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen 2002) and perceive these processes as a potential obstacle to the pursuit of possible private benefi ts. We explore these non-mutually-exclusive arguments below.
Informational Constraints
One potential explanation for the wide heterogeneity in adoption of performance-enhancing management practices across fi rms might be due to problems of perception-that is, founders may underestimate the practices' eff ect on productivity or overestimate the degree to which they are being implemented in practice (Gibbons and Henderson 2011) .
To investigate whether the perception problem might be a possible explanation of the managerial gap documented across founder CEO fi rms, we exploit a self-reported measure collected at the end of the WMS survey in which managers assess the quality of their own practices on a scale from 1 to 10. 8 Figure 4 .4 plots the average standardized WMS scores associated with the manager self-assessed scores (generated using a nonparametric lowess estimator overlaid onto the scatter plot of values) for both founder CEO 8. The exact wording of the question is: "Ignoring yourself, how well managed do you think the rest of the company is on scale: 1 to 10, where 1 is worst practice, 10 is best practice, and 5 is average?" 170 Victor Manuel Bennett, Megan Lawrence, and Raff aella Sadun fi rms and the other ownership types. The self-assessed own-fi rm management score and the one obtained through the WMS interviews are positively correlated for all but the highest level of self-assessment, where true score trends down slightly in both cases. Interestingly, however, managers at founder CEO fi rms tend to systematically overestimate how well managed their fi rm is-the same level of self-score maps into a systematically lower level of actual management score for founder CEO fi rms. 9 To look in more detail at the relationship between actual and self-assessed scores across ownership types, we defi ne an "awareness" metric in the following way. First, we categorize each fi rm according to its quintile in the actual management score distribution within its country. Second, we do the same for the self-assessed management quality by country. Third, we defi ne a variable taking values as follows: -1 if the diff erence between the actual and self-assessed quintile is less than -1, indicating that the manager systematically underestimated the relative quality of his or her fi rm's management quality; 0 if the diff erence in the quintiles is between -1 and 1 (included), if the self-assessment was relatively accurate; and 1 if the diff erence between
Fig. 4.4 Manager self-score of fi rm management compared with WMS management score
Note: The graph shows the result of a lowess estimator of self-responses of the interviewed plant manager when asked to indicate his/her impression of fi rm management (on a scale of 1-10) as compared to the management score derived from the WMS interview. 9. Because the phrasing of the question rules out the manager evaluating his/herself, these results do not seem to be consistent with personal overconfi dence. The results may be consistent with hiring policies resulting in less experienced managers or with weak performance monitoring policies that result in managers having a weak idea of what works, however. the actual and self-assessed quintile is greater than 1, indicating the manager systematically overestimated the relative quality of his or her fi rm's own management quality. Table 4 .6 summarizes the values of this variable across diff erent ownership types. Overall, about 57 percent of the managers appear to have a relatively good idea of where their fi rm stands in terms of management. About 30 percent seem to underestimate their fi rm's relative standing, while 13 percent overestimate their fi rm's management quality relative to the actual scores. The distribution of the scores across these three categories of managers, however, is systematically diff erent across ownership types. More specifi cally, founder CEO fi rms tend to have a larger fraction of fi rms that overestimate (22 percent vs. 11 percent) or have a realistic assessment (64 percent vs. 55 percent) of their scores and a much smaller fraction that underestimate their scores (14 percent vs. 34 percent).
To see whether these diff erences in awareness might be able to account for the diff erences in scores documented in section 4.3, we include the "awareness metric" in the specifi cation calculated in table 4.3, column (5), and test whether the inclusion of this metric has any sizable eff ect on the coeffi cient measuring the founder CEO dummy eff ect. The results of this exercise are shown in table 4.7. We start with a baseline specifi cation in column (2) where we simply show that the coeffi cient on the founder CEO dummy is still negative and signifi cant and of similar size in the sample of fi rms for which the Notes: Table includes raw number of fi rms for which underconfi dence, realism, and overconfi dence were detected in the interviewed plant manager's self-assessment of his/her fi rm's management. To collect the self-score, managers were asked on a scale of 1-10 how they perceived their fi rms' management profi ciency. This data was subsequently divided into quintiles, as were the WMS management scores, separately. Underconfi dence is classifi ed as having a selfassessment quintile value at least 2 quintiles lower than the actual management score of the fi rm. Realism is assigned to a fi rm if the interviewed manager's self-score of the fi rm's management is within 1 quintile (above or below) the actual management score for the fi rm. Lastly, Overconfi dence is a result of a managerial self-score of at least 2 quintiles higher than the fi rm's WMS management score. Along with the raw number of fi rms, the percentage of the total fi rms is included for all fi rms and, separately, founder CEO fi rms and fi rms under all other forms of ownership. self-assessment metric is available (column [2] compared to column [1]). 10 In column (3) we add the awareness metric-which reduces the coeffi cient on the founder CEO dummy by about 25 percent (from 0.125 to 0.093), but the coeffi cient is still sizable and signifi cant at the 1 percent level. In columns (4) to (7) we repeat the same experiment for fi rms in non-OECD (columns [4] and [5] ) and OECD countries (columns [6] and [7] ). In both cases, the coeffi cient on the founder CEO dummy remains negative and signifi cant; however, the reduction in its coeffi cient when the awareness variable in included is much larger in OECD countries (46 percent vs. 15 percent).
Overall, these results suggest that the lower managerial scores of founder CEO fi rms are associated with managers' systematic lack of awareness of the weakness of their fi rms' management quality (especially in OECD countries), but this lack of self-awareness does not fully explain the management gap that we fi nd for founder CEOs relative to other ownership types.
Institutions
In this section we explore whether ineffi cient institutions may be a possible driver of the lower managerial scores of founder CEO fi rms. The potential role of institutions in shaping the incentive to adopt formalized managerial practices can best be seen in terms of the framework proposed by Rajan (2012) to investigate when and to what extent founders will have the incentive to "standardize" their business practices, that is, to establish processes that "reduce the idiosyncratic and personalized aspects of the entrepreneur's role." This set-up is useful since the processes considered by Rajan encompass several of the managerial practices included in the WMS; for example: (a) formalizing implicit agreements with employees, (b) spreading the allocation of responsibilities across functions so that they can be more easily managed by outsiders, and (c) introducing strategic planning and information systems so that the information that a CEO needs to make decisions is more easily available.
One of the key insights of Rajan's framework is that the standardization decision creates a fundamental tension for the founder. On one hand, standardization might be necessary to attract external capital. Potential backers may see these practices as tools through which the human capital in the fi rm, particularly the CEO, becomes more replaceable, reducing risk by making the fi rm more amenable to external control. On the other hand, the founder might resist standardization precisely because it makes his or her personal human capital less critical and more easily substituted by an external CEO. In this setup, the founder is encouraged to adopt these "standardized" practices to gain access to capital markets. If capital markets are not well developed, the rewards associated with standardization will be reduced for the founder, hence reducing the incentive to incur the loss of personal rents associated with it. For this reason, institutions that support liquid capital markets may, by extension, support the adoption of superior management practices in founder-owned ventures.
Institutions might also have an impact on the standardization decisions even in absence of the need to raise capital through the market. For example, delegation to other talented managers able to guide the fi rm through the standardization process might be prohibitively costly in countries with poor contractual enforcement (Bandiera, Pratt, and Sadun 2013) . These costs might be based on objective constraints-that is, heightened risk of expropriation-or subjective perceptions of the associated risks-that is, lack of trust (Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen 2012) . Therefore, institutions that lower the costs of contractual enforcement or foster generalized trust may lower the costs of adopting superior management practices.
To investigate these issues we estimate the following model:
Our coeffi cient of interest is β, which captures the diff erential eff ect of different country-specifi c institutional variables (measured in the country in which the fi rms' central headquarters [CHQ] are located) 11 for founder CEO fi rms. If institutions play any role in shaping the adoption of formalized management practices, we would expect β > 0, meaning that the gap between founder CEO fi rms and other forms of ownership would be smaller in more effi cient institutional environments. 12 We also investigate diff erences across diff erent types of management practices covered by the WMS, by estimating this regression for the overall management score, and separately for the operations (all questions referring to monitoring and target practices) and people (all the questions pertaining to HR management practices) sections of the survey. We are specifi cally interested in practices related to managing people as they may most directly shape the founder's ability to retain control over the company. For example, introducing more formalized human resources (HR) may limit the founder's ability to promote family and friends to positions of power and, more generally, to use promotions to reward personal loyalty (Bandiera, Prat, and Sadun 2013) .
The results of this analysis are shown in table 4.8 (we cluster the standard 11. Headquarters is the level at which the institutional constraints are more likely to infl uence the decision to adopt management practices (see Bloom et al. [2013] for a similar application). An alternative approach would be to match the plant with the institutional variable measured in the country in which the plants are located. The results shown in this section are virtually unchanged when we use this alternative approach.
12. Note that all regressions include country dummies. Therefore, we do not estimate the linear correlation between country-level institutions and management, but their diff erential correlation across founder CEO fi rms and other ownership types. Notes: All columns estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) with standard errors clustered at the level of the country in which the fi rm's CHQ is located. Each interaction variable is tested in three columns with three diff erent standardized dependent variables: overall management score, operations management score, and people management score. The GDP per capita is drawn from the World Bank Development indicators, measured in the country in which the fi rm headquarters is located. Similarly, accounting standards is used as a proxy for fi nancial development in the country where the fi rm headquarters is located (Rajan and Zingales 1998) . Rule of law is drawn from the World Bank's Doing Business Survey. Trust is derived from the World Values Survey, and denotes the percent of people answering "yes" to the question "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful?" ***Signifi cant at the 1 percent level. **Signifi cant at the 5 percent level. *Signifi cant at the 10 percent level. errors at the CHQ country level throughout). We start in columns (1)-(3) by using, as a rough measure of institutional quality, the log of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (purchasing power parity [PPP] adjusted and expressed in constant 2005 USD). The interaction founder CEO * ln(GDP per capita) is not signifi cant across any of the columns. We obtain similarly insignifi cant results by following Rajan and Zingales (1998) in using a variable capturing diff erences in standards of fi nancial disclosures by country as a proxy for the founder's ability to attract external capital, which is necessary to providing the incentive to standardize. Similarly, the interaction between the founder CEO dummy and a variable capturing the overall quality of the Rule of Law (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2011) in columns (7)-(9) and a measure of generalized trust developed from the World Values Survey (World Values Survey Association 2008) in columns (10)-(12) are also all statistically insignifi cant.
In conclusion, we fail to fi nd evidence that development, or more specifically the quality of the institutional environment in which fi rms operate, has a role in explaining the relative gap in management practices of founder CEO fi rms. This fi nding holds for the overall management score, as well as the score relating to people management practices.
Private Benefi ts of Control
As mentioned above, a possible reason for the lack of adoption of formalized management practices across founder CEO fi rms is that standardization may directly dissipate the personal rents that the founder enjoys by being at the helm of his or her organization. For example, Hurst and Pugsley (2011) found that over 50 percent of new business owners reported nonpecuniary benefi ts as a reason for starting their businesses, citing reasons like "wanting fl exibility over schedule" and "to be one's own boss" as of fi rst-order importance for their choices. 13 Unfortunately, we do not have information on the diff erent individual preferences of the managers included in the WMS sample. Our approach is to instead investigate whether the adoption of management practices varies according to diff erences in societal preferences. A primary candidate for this type of exercise is the strength of family values in the country where the fi rm's central headquarters are located. Using an index derived from several questions included in the World Values Survey, 14 Bertrand and Schoar 13. That is consistent with Bennett and Chatterji's (2015) fi nding that 58 percent of people who considered starting a business did so because they wanted to "be [their] own boss, turn a hobby into a job, or control [their] own schedule." 14. Bertrand and Schoar (2006) used principal component analysis to combine the answers to fi ve family-related questions into a single index. The questions include (a) general importance family in life, (b) parental respect by children, (c) parental duty to their children, (d) importance of obedience as a quality in children, and (e) importance of independence as a quality in children. We use the same index as a proxy for family values. (2006) show that the strength of family values is highly correlated with the fraction of family fi rms-including founder CEO fi rms-in the economy and in general with the organizational structure of fi rms. In our setting, we hypothesize that strong family values may create an incentive for founder and family CEOs to select and reward employees on the basis of family affi liations rather than through potentially more objective merit-based HR processes, whose adoption is measured in our management index.
We investigate this idea in table 4.9, by including in our baseline regression an interaction between the Family Values Index and the founder CEO dummy. The interaction between the strength of family values and the founder CEO dummy is negative, as expected, but statistically insignifi cant when we look at the overall management score (column [1]). Interestingly, however, the insignifi cance is entirely driven by the operations questions of the survey. When we focus the index on the people section of the surveythat is, the type of practices that are likely to have a more direct eff ect on the ability to employ family members as employees-in column (3), we fi nd that stronger family values are associated with signifi cantly lower management scores for founder CEO fi rms.
In the subsequent columns of table 4.9 we investigate this result further by looking at its sensitivity with respect to the inclusion of additional country controls and examining various subsamples of the data. In column (4) we simply repeat the specifi cation adding as controls other relevant country characteristics (log GDP per capita and trust) and their interaction with the founder CEO dummy, to check whether the proxy for family values might capture other salient country characteristics. The coeffi cient on founder CEO * family values is reduced by about 30 percent, but it remains large and statistically signifi cant at the 10 percent level.
Because a great deal of research has investigated the impacts of family CEOs (e.g., Villalonga and Amit 2006) , and in fact often confl ate founder CEOs with family CEOs (Wasserman 2003) , in column (5) we add to the specifi cation an interaction between a dummy denoting family CEOs (i.e., CEOs that are affi liated to the founding family, but belong to later generations relative to the founder) and its interaction with family values. While the management scores of family CEO fi rms also appear to be lower in countries with strong family values, diff erently from founder CEO fi rms, the interaction is not statistically signifi cant.
In line with Rajan (2012) , we explore whether the relevance of family values varies according to the nature of the industry in which the fi rm operates. In particular, we would expect family values to play a relatively smaller role in industries with high external fi nancial dependence (defi ned as in Rajan and Zingales [1998] ). It is in these industries where the need to raise external capital is likely to dominate the personal returns to private control. In line with this hypothesis, in columns (6) and (7) we show that founder (1) and (2) are, respectively, the overall management z-score and the operations z-score. The dependent variable in columns (3)- (7) is the people management z-score. All columns estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) with standard errors clustered at the level of the country in which the fi rm's CHQ is located. Columns (6) and (7) split the sample according to the Rajan and Zingales fi nancial dependence variable (below and above the sample median). Family values is derived from the World Values Survey as described in Bertrand and Schoar (2006) and measured in the country in which the fi rm headquarters is located. The GDP per capita is drawn from the World Bank Development indicators, measured in the country in which the fi rm headquarters is located. Rule of law is drawn from the World Bank's Doing Business Survey. Trust is derived from the World Values Survey, and denotes the percent of people answering "yes" to the question "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful?" ***Signifi cant at the 1 percent level. **Signifi cant at the 5 percent level. *Signifi cant at the 10 percent level.
CEO * family values interaction is signifi cant only in industries with low external fi nancial dependence. 15 While these measures are proxies, rather than direct measures of nonpecuniary benefi ts, overall, these results provide suggestive evidence that diff erent considerations besides pure profi t maximization-for example, the value provided by foregoing objective HR processes to hire a family member or a friend in the fi rm-may play a role in explaining the relatively low adoption of management practices across founder CEO fi rms, especially with respect to processes aimed at formalizing HR processes for employee selection, reward, and retention.
Conclusion
We fi nd evidence that fi rms led by founder CEOs are signifi cantly less likely to implement basic management practices, even if these practices are associated with better fi rm performance. We explore the reasons for the diff erential adoption. Specifi cally, we investigate three potential causes: (a) that founders do not perceive their fi rms to have a management gap, (b) that the institutional environment dampens the incentive to implement superior practices, and (c) that nonpecuniary benefi ts from control counterbalance the lost rents from those worse practices. We fi nd support for both (a) and (c).
The results shown in this chapter are broadly consistent with an emerging literature emphasizing the heterogeneity in growth and motivation of entrepreneurial fi rms (Hurst and Pugsley 2011; Mullins and Schoar 2013; Bennett and Chatterji 2015) and with managerial studies focusing on the positive association between structured management practices and performance across start-ups (Dávila, Foster, and Jia 2010) . We extend this literature by providing additional evidence of the managerial practices adopted by founder CEO fi rms and their relationship with country-specifi c cultural norms, such as family values, across a wide range of countries and industries.
This chapter contributes to the existing literature on the performance of founder CEO fi rms. In contrast to our chapter, several studies report a positive eff ect of founder CEOs on fi rm performance (Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira 2009; Fahlenbrach 2009 ). One possible reason for this discrepancy results from the type of fi rms used in the analysis. While this chapter includes a wide range of private and public fi rms across several countries, the positive eff ect of founder CEOs is typically derived from the analysis of samples of public US enterprises, which may have implemented standardized manage-15. We also investigated whether the presence of strong family values could aff ect the returns to management practices by repeating the performance regressions from table 4.5, including an interaction term management * family values. We fi nd no evidence of a lower return associated with management practices in countries where family values are higher (see table 4A .3 in the appendix). ment practices in order to be able to raise external capital (Rajan 2012) or, more generally, be positively selected relative to representative founder CEO fi rms.
The persistent managerial gap of founder CEO fi rms described in this chapter suggests that government-sponsored programs aimed at fostering entrepreneurial activity may face signifi cant challenges in delivering growth. In particular, our results suggest that-in order to be eff ective-fi nancial support provided to new enterprises may need to be coupled with eff ective policies aimed at improving the managerial capabilities of founders and a better understanding of their motivations.
Unfortunately, a paucity of data on key diff erences in CEO skills, experience, preferences, and ability prevent us from exploring in further detail the mechanisms through which founder CEO status aff ects management practice adoption. We see this as a promising area for further research. 
